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Determined to Feel Free: The Psychological Reality of
Moral Responsibility
Sara Gottlieb
“My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will”
- William James
I. Introduction
Among introductory topics in philosophy, the
problem of free will is arguably far more troubling to the
ordinary student than many other issues. Free will and
conscious control, for one, affects every single individual –
there is no sense in which we can rise above concerns
regarding the autonomous control of our actions. And
second, the issue of free will is inextricably linked to
concerns of moral responsibility. Our fear of determinism is
a gaping existential anxiety that deep down we, as humans,
are not in control of our own choices. So all the deliberation
we perform in order to pick the correct decision is pointless,
it would seem, because everything has already been
preordained by the state of our brains. Steven Pinker
describes the consequences of relinquishing the feeling of
conscious deliberation:
If you suffer from this anxiety, I suggest the
following experiment. For the next few days,
don’t bother deliberating over your actions.
It’s a waste of time, after all; they have
already been determined…No, I am not
seriously suggesting you try this! But a
moment’s decisions should serve as a Valium
for the existential anxiety. The experience of
choosing is not a fiction, regardless of how
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the brain works…You cannot step outside it
or let it go on without you because it is you.
If the most ironclad form of determinism is
real, you could not do anything about it
anyway, because your anxiety about
determinism, and how you would deal with it,
would also be determined. It is the existential
fear of determinism that is the real waste of
time (Pinker 2008, 312).
Simply put, we blame people for an evil act or bad
decision only when they intend the consequences and could
have done otherwise. After all, we usually put less blame on
the hunter who shot his friend thinking he was a deer than
one who murders intentionally. We tend to show mercy to
the victim of torture who betrays a comrade and a delirious
patient who lashes out at family members because we feel
they are not in command of their faculties. Again, we do not
put small children on trial if they incidentally cause a death,
nor do we try inanimate objects and non-human animals in
the court of law – we consider them to be constitutionally
incapable of making an informed choice.
Free will and moral responsibility reads as a classic
paradox, based on the following set of inconsistent claims:
1. Every action is caused.
2. If an act is caused, then it is determined.
3. If an act is determined, then it is not done by
free will.
4. If an act is not done by free will, then its
agent is not fully morally responsible for that
act.
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5. If an agent is not fully
morally responsible for that act, then that
agent should not be punished for the act.
6. Yet some agents should be punished for
particular acts.
The debate over these claims emerges as a clash primarily
between compatibilists and incompatibilists. This
disagreement relies mostly upon claims 3-4. Incompatibilists
assert that if an act is completely determined, then the agent
is not fully morally responsible for that act. Compatibilists,
on the other hand, deny this assertion in favor of preserving
some degree of responsibility even when acts are
determined.
The worry of free will comes under scrutiny in light
of the scientific image. Owen Flanagan, in his book The
Problem of the Soul, attempts to reconcile the manifest
image with the scientific image of the mind. His portrayal of
the problem of free will as elucidated by the scientific image
will be the focus from here on out:
Suppose I accept that everything that happens
has a set of causes sufficient to produce it.
Given this set of causes, whatever they are,
this effect, whatever it is, is necessary.
Suppose I also accept that when I act I do so
for reasons, often after I think and deliberate.
Such acts are free. But when I act freely, we
can ask, why did I think, deliberate, and
reason in the way I did rather than in some
other way? […] There is no denying that I
reason, think, and deliberate; what is denied
is that my reasoning, thinking, and
deliberating are self-originating, things that
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cause my actions without themselves having
causes that make them necessary. If,
however, I think of my action in terms of the
wider causal nexus, as falling under the law
of universal causal determinism, then I can’t
conceive of my action as having been
different than it was (Flanagan 2002, 45).
As Pinker explains, people hoping that an uncaused
soul might rescue a sense of personal responsibility from the
deterministic natural sciences, mind sciences, and
evolutionary psychology, are in for disappointment. Daniel
Dennett, after all, points out that the last thing we want in a
soul is freedom to do anything that it desires (Dennett 1984).
If behavior were driven by an utterly free (in all sense of the
term) will, then we really could not hold people responsible
for their actions since an individual would not be deterred by
the threat of punishment or feelings of guilt. In short, a
completely free agent, floating on a different plane from the
powers of cause and effect, would be unaffected by moral
codes of law and ethics and not have any reason to act since
its will would be completely unrestrained (Pinker 2008).
This paper argues for a naturalist account of the
problem of free will. I will focus on the feeling of being a
morally responsible agent, not the ontological truth-value or
whether or not human beings are actual morally responsible
agents. Again, this focus on the feeling is a second-order
question that does not claim to answer the first-order
problem of whether any of the terms to which I will refer –
compatibilism, incompatibilism, free will, determinism,
etcetera - are true in their strict logical sense. I aim to show
that the feeling of being a morally free and responsible agent
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is a facet of human cognition that is not readily undermined
by contradictory knowledge of a naturalistic universe. My
naturalized account is similar to that of Hume’s skeptical
approach to the problem of induction, and appeals to
evidence from both psychology and experimental
philosophy. I call special attention to affective emotional
states, providing evidence for the profound influence of
emotion on moral decision-making, and the divide between
abstract (i.e., philosophically guided) and concrete (i.e.,
emotionally laden) intuitions.
II. Does knowledge of a naturalistically determined
universe lead to immoral behavior?
Pinker espoused an anecdotal account of why we
should fear determinism, but social psychologists have
approached the issue from an empirical perspective. In a
recent investigation, Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler
asked whether moral behavior draws on a belief in free will.
They examined whether inducing participants to believe that
human behavior is predetermined would encourage cheating.
Participants read one of two excerpts from Francis Crick’s
The Astonishing Hypothesis; those in the experimental
condition read about a fiercely deterministic and reductionist
view of the brain: “You, your joys and your sorrows, your
memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal
identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated
molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of neurons.”
The control group read an excerpt that discussed
consciousness but did not mention free will. Participants
then engaged in a seemingly unrelated task, and were told to
take a particular amount of money as compensation for their
participation after the experimenter had left the room.
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However, more money was available so that the participants
could cheat the system by taking more than instructed. They
found that participants who read deterministic statements
cheated by overpaying themselves for performance on a
cognitive task – a type of immoral behavior. Thus, they
suggest that the debate over free will has societal, as well as
scientific and theoretical implications. The authors write:
If exposure to deterministic messages
increases the likelihood of unethical actions,
then identifying approaches for insulating the
public against this danger becomes
imperative. Ultimately, in order to oppose the
unfavorable consequences of deterministic
sentiments, the field must first develop a
deeper understanding of why dismissing free
will leads to amoral behaviors. Does the
belief that forces outside the self determine
behavior drain the motivation to resist the
temptation to cheat, inducing a ‘why bother’
mentality? Doubting one’s free will may
undermine the sense of self as agent (Vohs
and Schooler 2008, 54).
In a follow-up study by noted social psychologist
Roy Baumeister, he and his colleagues sought to extend the
results of Vohs and Schooler into a broader context, namely
helping and aggression. They hypothesized that a disbelief
in free will increases aggression and reduces helping since
free will is crucial for motivating people to control their
automatic impulses in favor of more prosocial types of
behavior. Vohs and Schooler proposed that doubting free
will serves as a subtle cue that exerting volition is futile and
induces the “why bother” mentality. Thus, Baumeister
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sought to demonstrate that making people disbelieve in free
will acts as a nonconscious prime to act in relatively
automatic ways, which includes acting upon more selfish
impulses rather than exerting control and self-restraint.
In their 2009 study, Baumeister, Masicampo and
DeWall used an improved methodology (most notably,
improved prime passages describing free will or
determinism) built upon Vohs and Schooler’s experiment
and found that prosocial tendencies (as characterized by a
willingness to help) were reduced among participants who
were induced to believe in determinism and disbelieve in
free will. That is, these participants were less willing to help
across a wide array of situations and opportunities than were
those in the control group (i.e., those who were induced to
believe in free will). In follow-up experiments, they focused
on self-control and found that a disbelief in free will makes
people reluctant to expend their energy in acts of selfrestraint. Furthermore, since aggression is an automatic and
antisocial response, they hypothesized that the deterministic
beliefs are related to aggression by depleting the ability to
override certain types of socially undesirable automatic
impulses. Specifically, they found that those individuals who
were chronically high in disbelief in free will were also less
likely to help others in distress than those who were
skeptical of rejecting free will.
The broader implications of these results suggest that
volition and self-control require the person to expend
energy, and that these expenditures enable them to act
prosocially. Apparently, a disbelief in free will subtly
reduces people’s ability to expend that energy, and the
disbelief in free will serves as a cue to act on impulse, which
generally promotes selfish actions such as aggressing and
refusing to help. Baumeister et al. concede that these results
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have nothing to say about free will as objective reality;
indeed, their results could hold valid even if free will is a
complete illusion. The authors write, “Some philosophical
analyses may conclude that a fatalistic determinism is
compatible with highly ethical behavior, but the present
results suggest that many laypersons do not yet appreciate
that possibility” (Baumeister et al. 2009, 267).
Without explicit statement, both Vohs and Schooler
and Baumeister et al. seem to be showing that people hold
incompatibilist views regarding determinism and moral
responsibility. More generally, they hold that a belief in free
will, regardless of its ontological truth, is pertinent to
prosocial behavior and morality. These experimenters
sought to answer the question of whether the knowledge of
determinism undermines a sense of moral agency, and they
adhere to the conclusion that such reminders negatively
affect our social interactions in highly unconscious,
automatic ways. But there also exists a competing view that
this feeling of being a morally free and responsible agent,
illusory or not, has limits to the capacity by which it can be
undermined. Daniel Wegner, a Harvard psychologist and
author of The Illusion of Conscious Will, writes:
I’m a case in point. I’ve devoted years of my
life to the study of conscious will…If the
illusion could be dispelled by explanation, I
should be some kind of robot by now, a
victim of my own nefarious schemes. No self,
no magic, no inner agent. Yes, it’s true, when
I’m on the dance floor I may look a bit
robotic to some – but I’m happy to report that
despite my personal flurry of illusion busting,
I remain every bit as susceptible to the
experience of conscious will as the next
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person. It feels like I’m doing things (Wenger
2008, 237).
I must clarify that I do not doubt the view that knowledge
can diminish our sense of moral responsibility and conscious
control by varying degrees. A greater understanding of the
biological bases of mental illness has indeed caused subtle
changes to the ways in which we ascribe punishment to
criminals whose actions were deemed beyond their control.
But in the minute-to-minute everyday sense – somebody
cuts me off while changing lanes on the highway, or misses
a scheduled meeting and leaves me waiting – I argue that the
ways in which we see both ourselves and others as moral
agents cannot be undermined. A Humean approach
appropriately illustrates the naturalist account for which I am
arguing.
III. Hume’s skepticism: the problem of induction and the
problem of free will
Hume distinctively sought to ground human
knowledge on empirical natural facts to develop a
naturalized account of human cognition. Hume describes the
problem of induction by the fact that experience does not
produce the idea of an effect from an impression of its cause
by reason, but rather by the imagination or certain
association and relation of perceptions. The crux of the
problem is that if understanding produced inductive
conclusions, then inductive reason would be based on the
assumption that nature is uniform, or that those instances
that we have not experienced follow the experiences of the
past. If this were the premise to be established by reasoning,
then reasoning would be either deductive or probabilistic.
Since the principle cannot be proven deductively, since
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whatever is proven deductively is a necessary truth, and this
principle isn’t necessary since its antecedent is consistent
with the denial of its consequent. Causal or probabilistic
reasoning also cannot prove it, because it is presupposed by
all such reasoning.
In The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
Hume classifies all reason into either relation of ideas or
matters of facts. Matters of fact are propositions whose
negations do not necessarily lead to contradictions. Hume
regards my assertion that the sun will not rise tomorrow no
less intelligible, nor no more a contraction, than the assertion
that it will. So all reasoning concerning matter of fact is
founded on the relation between cause and effect; after
repeated experiences of events of type A being followed by
type B, we will be prone to infer event B following an
experience of event A. There is no necessary connection
between events A and B, and the post-hoc reasoning that B
is followed by a fact A is a type of inductive reasoning. This
causal chain of reasoning extends backward into the further
past as we infer a posteriori. But we cannot establish a
connection without having had an experience in which event
A is followed by event B, so it logically follows that cause
and effect cannot be reasoned for using a priori
argumentation (Hume 1999).
This is the negative component of Hume’s argument,
as he rules out accounts of induction that view it as the
product of reason. Causal reasoning is the strongest
associative relation and perhaps also the most important,
since by means of inferring this relation can we go beyond
the evidence of our memory and senses. We may even say
that we are, in a sense, “addicted” to inferring a connection
between the present fact and that which is inferred from it.
Causal reasoning is not a priori. We discover causes and
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effects through experience, not by reason, and most ordinary
causal judgments become so familiar over time that our
judgments seems automatic.
The process that produces our causal expectations is
itself causal; customs and habits determine the mind to
assume that the future is congruent with the past insofar as it
assumes like effects to follow from like causes. Hume does
not go so far as saying that we are justified when we engage
in inductive reasoning, yet also realizes that his negative
phase exhausts all other forms of reasoning. We have no
choice but to induce, and we have no choice but to expect
laws of the past to hold similarly in the future. I have no
logical reason to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, but
I just cannot help it. When I get out of bed in the morning, I
have no reason to believe that the gravity of today is the
same of the gravity of yesterday, and that I won’t fly toward
the ceiling. When I open my mouth to speak, there is no
guarantee that words will come forth. Yet without any of
these inductive inferences, I could not exist. I could not
convey ideas through language, and I could not move my
body. Without inductive properties, it seems that human
existence comes to a complete halt.
This skeptical approach parallels the problem of free
will. Vohs and Schooler concluded that we must insulate the
public from knowledge of determinism since it leads to an
increase in morally wrong behaviors. But if Hume is right
with regard to inductive inference, then we may view the
undeniable feeling of being a free and morally responsible
agent as an analogously similar and necessity facet of
naturalized human cognition. If we imagine a world in
which we believe ourselves to be completely constrained,
and within a world in which we have no ability to do
otherwise and all actions are determined by antecedent
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causes, which are themselves determined by antecedent
causes, so on and so forth, then even thinking about our own
freedom, as we are presently doing, becomes exceedingly
problematic. Our present thoughts are a determined act that
none of us are deliberatively and consciously willing; we
must not doubt that we are indeed reasoning at the present
moment, but this reasoning is nonetheless derived from
antecedent causes beyond our control. Conceiving this world
feels beyond the capacities of human cognition, and
navigating a world in which we come to truly internalize this
sense of naturalistic determinism, although logically
possible, appears far too abstract for the human mind.
By taking the Humean route, I argue that, in light of
a strong scientific image, we indeed have reason to believe
that actions have antecedent physical causes. These actions
may not have one sufficient or necessary cause (i.e.,
monocausation must not necessarily hold true), but actions
are nonetheless driven by complex sets of factors that
necessarily guide the future in one direction. Hume argued
that we have no justified reason to believe that the sun either
will rise tomorrow; in parallel fashion, we have no reason to
believe both ourselves and others are the originators of
actions and should feel morally responsible as such.
Inductive inference is central to the very reasoning that
makes us human, and I argue that the feeling of being
morally responsible, and the feeling that other people are
morally responsible as well, is naturalistically grounded in a
human necessity that can not be undermined by
contradictory evidence.1
1

As I stressed earlier, I do not doubt the degree to which ascribing
responsibility to both ourselves and others can be diminished in varying
degrees, unlike the absolute necessity of inductive inference. However,
there exists a sincere limit to which a feeling of agency can be
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IV. Are we intuitive compatibilists or incompatibilists?
The project of experimental philosophy is, in part, to
explore the common intuitions of normal folk. This
innovative movement seeks to return the discipline of
philosophy to a focus on questions about how people
actually think and feel; it departs from a long-standing
tradition of armchair exploration as experimental
philosophers go out and conduct systematic experiments to
reach a better understanding of people's ordinary intuitions
about philosophically significant questions. Experimental
philosophers approach the question of free will by
questioning how the paradox of responsibility arises and
why it persists both among professional philosophers and
the folk. If only accomplished philosophers had conflicting
intuitions about the topic, then the paradox would not be so
troubling or persistent in the progression of literature. And
when experimental philosophers speak of intuition, they
refer to inclinations to believe claims whose attractiveness is
not dependent on any conscious inference. Common
intuitions are not especially reflective, and these are the ones
studied most by experimental philosophers.
Shaun Nichols, a leader in the field, explored the lay
understanding of choice, and found that both children and
adults tended to treat moral choices as indeterminist. Here,
they were given cases of moral choice events (e.g., a girl
steals a candy bar) and physical events (e.g., a pot of water
comes to a boil) and asked whether, if everything in the
world was the same right up until he event occurred, the
event must occur. Both the children and the adults were
more likely to answer yes in the case of the physical event
undermined, and for this reason the analogy between induction and free
will is highly appropriate, although not completely parallel.
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than the moral event (Nichols 2004). Thus, these results
seem to suggest that people believe that some cases of moral
decisions are not determined. People intuitively believe that
their actions are not governed by the same physical laws that
govern inanimate objects.
A parallel agenda recently explored whether people
are intuitive compatibilists or incompatibilists about moral
responsibility. Woolfolk, Doris and Darley provided
participants with a story about an individual who is
kidnapped and given a “compliance drug” that makes it
impossible for him to disobey orders. When the kidnappers
order him to act immorally, he has no choice but to obey.
Participants were either in the low identification condition
and told that the agent did not want to perform the immoral
act, or in the identification condition, and told that that he
wanted to perform it all along. The results demonstrated a
main effect of identification; those in the high identification
condition attributed significantly higher ratings of
responsibility to the agent that those in the low identification
condition (Woolfolk et al. 2006). This is in line with
Frankfurt’s compatibilist claim that responsibility depends
on identification (Frankfurt 1969).
A further study by Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and
Turner poses a more significant threat for the view that
people are intuitive incompatibilists. They found that
participants hold agents morally responsible even when that
agent is acting in a completely deterministic universe.
Participants read the following scenario
Imagine that in the next century we discover
all the laws of nature, and we build a
supercomputer which can deduce from these
laws of nature and from the current state of
everything in the world exactly what will be
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happening in the world at any future time. It
can look at everything about the way the
world is and predict everything about how it
will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that
such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at
the state of the universe at a certain time on
March 25th, 2150 A.D., twenty years before
Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then
deduces from this information and the laws of
nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity
Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26th, 2195. As
always, the supercomputer’s prediction is
correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm
on January 26th, 2195.
After reading the vignette, participants were immediately
asked whether or not Jeremy is morally responsible for
robbing the bank. Strikingly, 83% responded that he is
blameworthy. This effect was replicated in two further
experiments with different scenarios, providing strong
evidence that people regard moral responsibility compatible
with determinism (Nahmias et al 2005).
The results described above raise a significant
dilemma: if people so consistently demonstrate compatibilist
positions on experimental questionnaires, then for what
reason does the debate over incompatibilism persist?
Nichols and Knobe suspect that there is more at work here
than has typically been acknowledged. In their view, most
people have a logical bias toward incompatibilist theories of
moral responsibility (at least in our culture), and these
tendencies are easily elicited in philosophical discussion and
especially within the classroom. However, in addition to
these preferences, people also exhibit immediate affective
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reactions to vignettes describing immoral behaviors. They
write, “What we see in the results of Nahmias and
colleagues is, in part, the effect of these affective reactions.
To uncover people’s underlying theories, we need to offer
them questions that call for more abstract, theoretical
cognition” (Nichols and Knobe 2008, 109).
Nichols and Knobe wished to explore whether
participants would be more likely to report compatibilist or
incompatibilist intuitions if they controlled for emotional
and motivational factors. Thus, they isolated two conditions:
in the concrete condition, they aimed to elicit greater
affective responses, whereas in the abstract condition, they
aimed to trigger theoretical, armchair cognition. They
hypothesized that people would be more likely to act as
incompatibilists in the concrete (i.e., emotional) condition.
Participants were provided with descriptions of
Universe A and Universe B; in Universe A, everything that
happens is completely caused by whatever happened before
it, and this is true from the very beginning of the universe up
until the present. Universe B describes an environment in
which almost everything is completely caused by whatever
happened previously. Thus, the key difference between the
two is that, given the past, whether or not each decision has
to happen. Participants were asked which universe is most
like their own, and to explain their answer. Over 90%
reported to live in a universe most like Universe B,
suggesting that people intuitively see their world as
indeterministic.
As a follow-up, participants then answered a
question regarding compatibilism. They were randomly
assigned to either the concrete condition or the abstract
condition. In the concrete condition, they read the following
statement:
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In Universe A, a man named Bill has become
attracted to his secretary, and he decides that
the only way to be with her is to kill his wife
and three children. He knows that it is
impossible to escape from his house in the
even of a fire. Before he leaves on a business
trip, he sets up a device in his basement that
burns down the house and kills his family. Is
Bill fully morally responsible for killing his
wife and children?
In this condition, 72% gave a compatibilist response,
indicating that Bill should be held fully morally responsible.
This is synonymous with the findings of Nahmias et al.
2005). In the abstract condition, they were asked the
following: In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be
fully morally responsible for their actions? As hypothesized,
an incredible 86% of participants gave the incompatibilist
response. In short, these results indicate that affect interacts
with judgments to elicit compatibilist intuition.
This experiment still leaves open questions about
whether the responses are actually the product of emotion. It
is conceivable that what mattered was the concreteness
itself, not the actual affect associated with concreteness.
That is, perhaps the compatibilist responses were elicited
because the scenario described a particular act by a
particular individual, and the results are not due to affect
alone. To investigate this, Nichols and Knobe created a new
moderator in which subjects were randomly assigned to
either the high affect or the low affect condition. For high
affect, they were asked: As he has done many times in the
past, Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible that Bill is
fully morally responsible for raping the stranger? In the low
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affect condition, they read: As he has done many times in
the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it possible
that Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his
taxes? For half of the subjects, the question stipulated that
the agent was in Universe A; for the other half, it was in
Universe B. Thus, they created a 2x2 factorial design of
affect and universe. They found that even when concreteness
was controlled for, affect impacts people’s intuitions about
responsibility under deterministic circumstances (Nichols
and Knobe 2008). The complete results were as follows:

High
affect
case
Low
affect
case

Agent in
indeterminist
universe
95%
89%

Agent in
determinist
universe
64%
23%

Overall, we find that both affect and concreteness are
important in the process that generates compatibilist
judgments. Explanatory models exist for both of these
criteria as independent identities, but as we will see in the
coming section, they complement each other remarkably
well as I come to argue for a naturalized account of treating
both ourselves and others as morally free and responsible
agents.
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V. Explanatory models: Affect, social intuitionism, and
concreteness
Within psychology, the field of social cognition has
recently shifted focus from the deliberative aspects of
decision making to the highly automatic and unconscious
ones. More specifically, emotion research portrays automatic
processes as heavily dependent upon affective states. The
primary method with which psychologists test for
nonconscious influences on cognition is called nonconscious
priming. John Bargh and colleagues asked participants to
complete a scrambled sentence task either loaded with terms
associated with the elderly or neutral terms. Unbeknownst to
the participants, researchers measured the speed with which
they moved about the room, and found that those who were
nonconsciously primed to think about the elderly actually
walked slower than those in the control condition. They
showed that even when a goal or concept is induced
implicitly, an effect may still emerge. In a follow-up study,
Bargh et al. provided participants with scrambled words
either loaded with the concept of rudeness of politeness.
They were instructed to notify the experimenter when they
were ready to move to the next task; however, the
experimenter was engaged in conversation and the
participant would have to interrupt in order to give
notification. The experimenters found that those in the
rudeness condition interrupted significantly more than those
in the other condition, remarkably demonstrating that our
decisions are influenced in ways that fall far outside of
awareness (Bargh et al. 1996). They write, “For every
psychological effect (e.g., behavior, emotion, judgment,
memory, perception), there exists a set of causes or
antecedent conditions that uniquely lead to that effect”
(Bargh and Ferguson 2000, 295).
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Social psychologist Jennifer Lerner has heavily
influenced the literature on emotional cognition, and found
that when subjects’ were primed to arouse negative
emotions, they held agents more responsible and more
deserving of punishment; indeed, this even held true when
the negative emotions were aroused by an unrelated event
(Lerner et al. 1998). In their experimental design,
participants in an anger condition watched a violent film of a
bully beating up a teenager, while subjects in the neutralcontrol condition watched a video clip of abstract figures.
All participants then attributed responsibility for various
negligent behaviors to fictional characters. Interestingly,
those in the anger condition gave higher responsibility
ratings than subjects in the control condition. This provides
significant evidence that emotions induced by outside events
(i.e., the film) impact responsibility judgments in clearly
unrelated scenarios. A natural interpretation of this data is
that the emotion biased the participants in making their
assessments of reasonability, and thus detracted from their
abilities to reason in a more logical manner.
This literature built a remarkably strong foundation
for the emerging field of moral psychology, which
investigates the role of emotion, automatic judgments and
other motivational factors in forming intuitions in ethically
relevant situations. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has
pioneered morality research with his social intuitionist
model of moral judgments (Haidt 2001). His central claim
states that moral judgment is caused by quick moral
intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post
facto moral reasoning; this is not an anti-rationalist model,
but rather alludes to the complex and dynamic ways by
which intuition, social influences and reasoning interact to
produce moral judgment.
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Haidt motivated his model with what he calls moral
dumbfounding. When participants were presented with a
story describing a brother and sister (Julie and Mark) who
decide to make love but have safe sex and actually grow
closer from the experience, most responded that they felt it
was wrong but could not articulate why. Haidt explains that
while moral emotions (e.g., sympathy, disgust) are
sometimes significant inputs in the reasoning process, they
are not the direct causes of moral judgments. Participants
who read about Mark and Julie experienced a strong visceral
response to the vignette, and felt a small flash of disapproval
for the act before they were able to actually articulate why
they felt this way. In line with the social intuitionist model,
these individuals made quick, automatic moral intuitions as
influenced by their affective states, and then attempted to
follow these intuitions with deliberative reasoning as
justification for their responses. At a certain point, they
realized that their intuitions were logically irrational; when
asked, after many times, why the act was wrong, they
ultimately responded with, “I don’t know why, but it just is.”
Haidt’s social intuitionist model provides plausible
explanation for the different intuitions generated in Nichols
and Knobe’s high and low affect cases. But there remains
the case of judgments made in concrete versus abstract
situations, and Haidt’s research in emotion and moral
intuition appropriately leads to this discussion. Concrete
situations aptly describe cases occurring in our own worlds,
with which we are highly familiar, and from which we can
draw a great deal of experiential knowledge. Abstract
conditions, however, concern a world with which we are far
less familiar, and must draw upon logical a priori reasoning
to form judgments.
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Concreteness and abstractness are clearly contrasted
in the case of Nichols and Knobe’s Universe A and Universe
B. Recall that the vast majority of participants deemed
Universe B most like our own; thus, when answering
questions about Universe B, they drew upon concrete
notions of everyday experience to form intuitions. Universe
A, however, is slightly ambiguous since participants did not
believe themselves to have first-hand knowledge of and
experience with a world in which human decisions are
completely governed and determined by the same physical
laws that govern inanimate objects. Do the participants have
family in this alternate universe? What are the
environmental influences on action? Is there law
enforcement? In this respect, Universe A is far less concrete.
The majority of people believed themselves to be familiar
with Universe B, and hence formed a vast array of beliefs,
images and other cognitive attitudes about this world. These
complex sets of formations draw upon affective responses,
and form distinctive cognitive attitudes about the world. We
may conclude from this discussion that concreteness tends to
stimulate compatibilist intuitions and abstractness tends to
stimulate incompatibilist intuitions.
There is markedly distinctive manner by which
people form intuitions as they move from the philosopher’s
armchair or an academic classroom and into the concrete
nature of real world social interactions. Haidt’s social
intuitionist model of moral judgment motivates this
assertion, as concrete situations draw upon dynamic sets of
experience and knowledge; since an astonishing proportion
of our memories and values are stored as involving strong
emotional components, concrete situations elicit the
automatic and unconscious intuitions for which the model
argues. Abstract cases, on the other hand, elicit a separate
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type of intuition. The professional philosopher, or simply the
law person who is asked to reason for an abstract case about
some alternate universe, allows for more of the post hoc
reasoning that Haidt includes in his model. Since moral
intuitions are, under many circumstances, tiny flashes of
either approval or disapproval, there are strong evolutionary
reasons for the persistence of intuitive judgments in highly
concrete cases. The disgust emotion, for example, originated
as an oral defensive mechanism against noxious stimuli and
parasitic substances, yet has transitioned far from its
evolutionarily intended purpose and into the moral domain.
Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe and Bloom found that an individual
sensitivity to physical elicitors of disgust predicts an
intuitive disapproval of homosexual behavior, which is
potentially regarded as a type of sexual impurity (Inbar et al.
2009). The disgust response has a strong evolutionary value,
yet causes an over-generalized response in some present
moment social situations. But people are nonetheless able to
override implicit judgments of this sort and rely upon post
hoc deliberation to form an explicit preference. Applied to
the discussion of concrete and abstract situations, we know
that people are less able to regulate their cognitive processes,
and instead fall back on more automatic judgments, when
under strong emotional influence. Concrete situations elicit
strong, often visceral, emotional states that cause people to
rely on certain automatic intuitions that do not necessarily
coincide with the intuitions they would form if they had
ample time and cognitive resources to devote for full
deliberative reasoning.
In this section, I examined the cognitive effects of
affect and concreteness on intuition. High affect and
concrete situations elicit compatibilist intuitions more than
low affect abstract situations. This is demonstrated by
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experimental philosophers, and is motivated by Haidt’s
social intuitionist model.
V. Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of free will from a
psychological perspective. I asked whether knowledge of
determinism undermines the feeling of being a morally
responsible agent. Vohs and Schooler used experimental
investigation to find that people primed to believe in a
naturalistically determined universe acted more immorally
than those in a control condition. If their conclusion is
correct, then it seems as if we have reason to worry.
However, I argue here for a naturalized account of referring
to both ourselves and others as morally free and responsible
agents. I draw the analogy to Hume’s skeptical account of
the problem of induction; this feeling of moral agency is
fundamental to and extricable from human cognition, much
in the same way that inductive inference presupposes human
thought and interaction. The problem of free will is perhaps
so troubling because conflicting intuitions regarding the
compatibility or incompatibility of moral responsibility are
widespread and persistent among both the philosopher and
lay folk. Experimental philosophers have devoted empirical
investigation to the issue at hand by uncovering intuitions of
compatibilism or incompatibilism and varying affective
elicitors and the concreteness of target situations. These
factors accurately account for conflicting intuitions, as
demonstrated by Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral
judgment. When our intuitions refer to high affect and
concrete cases, we fall back on automatic intuitions in favor
of compatibilist judgments. As we leave the armchair and
venture into the complex social dynamic of real-world
situations, these intuitions are fundamental to human
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cognition. This is a naturalized account of moral agency, for
we see that knowledge of naturalism or determinism does
not readily undermine the way we treat both ourselves and
others as morally free and responsible agents. Even in a
world believed to be naturally determined, we see moral
action as unrestrained by the physical laws that govern
inanimate objects. Ontological dispute surrounds the firstorder truth or free will or determinism, but the psychological
truth of feeling morally free is an undeniable reality.
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